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Non-Technical Summary 
Research conducted by university researchers for industry constitutes one of the main 
channels through which knowledge and technology are transferred from science to the 
private sector. Since the value of such inputs for the innovation performance of firms has 
been found to be considerable, it is not surprising that firms increasingly seek direct access 
to university knowledge. In particular, industry funding for public sector R&D has been 
steadily increasing in most OECD countries.  
The growing amount of industry funded research, however, spurs concerns regarding 
possible long-run effects on scientific output. While some policy makers argue that the 
potential of universities to foster and accelerate industrial innovations is not yet fully 
exploited, others are concerned with the distraction of academics from their actual 
research mission. Whereas from a private-sector perspective, the benefits from 
collaborating with academia are found to be unambiguously positive, the effects on the 
scientific sector are not as clear cut. Science may benefit from the initiation of new ideas 
from industry or the use of industry funds for hiring additional researchers or investing in 
lab equipment. On the other hand, traditional incentives in scientific research 
characterized by knowledge sharing and rapid disclosure of research outcomes may be 
distorted. Moreover, commercial interests may induce scientists to select research projects 
on the basis of their perceived value in the private sector and not solely on the basis of 
scientific progress.  
Previous research has provided little empirical evidence on the effects of industry funding 
for university research on scientific productivity at the level of the individual researcher. 
This study aims at filling this gap by studying the effects of industry sponsoring on 
professors’ scientific productivity. Our data contains information on laboratory and 
funding characteristics as well as on publication and patent output for 678 professors at 46 
different universities in Germany covering a broad range of research fields in science and 
engineering. The results show that a higher budget share from industry reduces the 
publication output of professors in terms of both quantity and quality in subsequent years. 
In turn, industry funding has a positive impact on the quality of applied research if 
measured by patent citations. Industry funding may thus still have beneficial effects by 
improving impact and quality of more applied research.  
We believe the results from this study are provocative for policy analysis and public 
funding authorities. An increasing reliance on industry funding compared to stagnating 
core funding may indeed affect the development of science in the long run if publication 
output is reduced. On the other hand, industry funding may be very valuable for 
professors’ applied research and the success of their patenting activities.  
  
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Wissenschaftliche Forschung im Auftrag von und in Zusammenarbeit mit der privaten 
Wirtschaft stellt einen der wesentlichen Kanäle von Technologietransfer dar. Aufrund des 
beträchtlichen Wertes wissenschaftlicher Forschung für Unternehmen, ist es nicht 
verwunderlich, dass Unternehmend zunehmend Zugang zu universitärem Wissen suchen. 
Insbesondere die Bereitstellung finanzieller Mittel der Privatwirtschaft für Universitäten, 
so genannte industrielle Drittmittel, stieg in den vergangenen Jahren stetig.  
Diese zunehmende Bedeutung der Industrie als Finanzierungsquelle, weckt aber auch 
Bedenken im Hinblick auf potentielle Langzeiteffekte auf Quantität, Qualität und 
Ausrichtung wissenschaftlicher Forschung. Während auf der einen Seite argumentiert 
wird, dass das Potential von Universitäten zur Unterstützung industrieller Innovationen 
noch nicht ausgeschöpft sei, wird andererseits auf eine potentielle Ablenkung der 
Wissenschaftler vom eigentlichen Forschungsauftrag verwiesen. Vorteile für die 
Wissenschaft bestehen in der Generierung neuer Ideen und der Nutzung der akquirierten 
finanziellen Mittel für die Einstellung von zusätzlichen Mitarbeitern oder der Anschaffung 
(technischer) Ausstattung. Andererseits können Anreize wissenschaftlicher Arbeit, die 
traditionell durch freien Austausch von Wissen und unverzügliche Veröffentlichung von 
Forschungsergebnissen gekennzeichnet sind, beeinflusst werden. Darüber hinaus können 
kommerzielle Interessen Wissenschaftler dazu verleiten, Forschungsinhalte nicht allein 
aufgrund ihres wissenschaftlichen Wertes, sondern aufgrund des erwarteten Wertes für die 
Industrie auszuwählen.  
Die bisherige Forschung lieferte kaum Schlussfolgerungen im Hinblick auf die 
wissenschaftlichen Auswirkungen industrieller Forschungsfinanzierung. Das Ziel dieser 
Studie war es daher, die Effekte von durch die Privatwirtschaft finanzierter Forschung auf 
wissenschaftliche Publikationen und Patentanmeldungen von Professoren zu analysieren. 
Die Datenbasis umfasst Informationen über 678 Forschungseinheiten in Natur- und 
Ingeneurwissenschaften an 46 verschiedenen deutschen Hochschulen, deren 
Finanzierungsstruktur, sowie die Publiaktions- und Patentaktivitäten des leitenden 
Professors. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass ein höherer Anteil industrieller Drittmittel am 
Budget der Forschungseinheit, die Publikationsanzahl in den Folgejahren sowohl in 
quanitiativer als auch in qualitativer Hinsicht reduziert. Im Gegensatz dazu wirkt sich der 
Anteil industrieller Forschungsfinanzierung positiv auf angewandte Forschung aus, wenn 
der Erfolg oder Einfluss dieser Forschung anhand von Patentzitationen in den Folgejahren 
gemessen wird. Diese Ergebnisse haben Konsequenzen für Politikbewertung und 
Hochschulfinanzierung. Ein zunehmender Verlass auf industrielle Drittmittel zur 
Forschungsfinanzung kann in Anbetracht stagnierender Grundmittel auf Dauer die 
Entwicklung der Wissenschaft durch einen Verlust an Veröffentlichungen beeinträchtigen. 
Auf der anderen Seite, kann die Finanzierung durch die Industrie wertvoll für eher 
angewandte Forschung sein und den Erfolg von Patentaktivitäten erhöhen. 
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Abstract 
 
University research provides valuable inputs to industrial innovation. It is therefore 
not surprising that private sector firms increasingly seek direct access through 
funding public R&D. This development, however, spurred concerns about possible 
negative long-run effects on scientific performance. While previous research has 
mainly focused on a potential crowding-out of scientific publications through 
commercialization activities such as patenting or the formation of spin-off 
companies, we study the effects of direct funding from industry on professors’ 
publication and patenting efforts. Our analysis of a sample of 678 professors at 46 
higher education institutions in Germany shows that a higher share of industry 
funding of a professor’s research budget results in a lower publication outcome both 
in terms of quantity and quality in subsequent years. For patents, we find that 
industry funding increases their quality measured by patent citations.  
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1 Introduction 
Over the past decades, universities have widened their activities beyond teaching and 
academic research. In particular, university research provides knowledge inputs to private-
sector innovation (Jaffe 1989; Beise and Stahl 1999; Salter and Martin 2001 for a review). 
One of the main channels through which knowledge and technology are transferred from 
science to the private sector is research conducted by university researchers for industry 
(e.g. Mansfield 1998; Schartinger et al. 2000, Cohen et al. 2002). The value of such inputs 
for the innovation performance of firms has been found to be considerable (Mansfield 
1991, 1995, 1998; Narin et al. 1997; Zucker et al. 2002; Hall et al. 2001a; Cassiman et al 
2008; Toole and Czarnitzki 2009). It is therefore not surprising that firms increasingly 
seek direct access to university knowledge.  
A recent OECD study shows a rise in industry funding for public sector R&D in most 
OECD countries. In Europe, Germany experienced the most significant increase. From 
1997 to 2007, industry funding for public R&D in Germany doubled from 6.2% to 12.5% 
of R&D expenditure in higher education. Likewise in other continental European 
countries such as Italy (0.6% in 1997 and 3.2% in 2007), and Austria (2% in 1998 and 
4.5% in 2007) private sector funding for public R&D is growing (OECD, R&D Database, 
June 2009). In many European countries, this trend had been accompanied by stagnating 
public core funding (see Figure 1 in section 4 of this article and Hornbostel 2001 for older 
data for Germany). 
This development spurs concerns regarding possible long-run effects of increased industry 
involvement on scientific output. While some policy makers argue that the potential of 
universities to foster and accelerate industrial innovations is not yet fully exploited and 
thus believe that there is still room for improving the (social) returns from academic 
research (European Commission 2003a,b; OECD 2007; Dosi et al. 2006), others are 
concerned with the distraction of academics from their actual research mission. From a 
private-sector perspective, the benefits of collaborating with academia are found to be 
unambiguously positive, whereas the effects on the scientific sector are not as clear cut. 
Science may benefit from the initiation of new ideas from industry or the use of industry 
funds for hiring additional researchers or investment in lab equipment (Rosenberg 1998; 
Siegel et al. 1999). On the other hand, traditional incentives in scientific research 
characterized by knowledge sharing and rapid disclosure of research outcomes may be 
distorted (Blumenthal et al. 1996a,b; Campbell et al. 2002; Krimsky 2003). Moreover, 
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commercial interests may induce scientists to select research projects on the basis of their 
perceived value in the private sector and not solely on the basis of scientific progress. 
Increased funding from industry may be accompanied by a shift in scientists’ research 
agendas leading to a lower number of academic publications and less efforts devoted to 
basic research.  
Previous research on the potential side-effects of increased commercialization of 
university research has generally focused on academic patenting (e.g. Henderson et al. 
1998a,b; Thursby and Thursby 2002; Azoulay et al. 2009; Czarnitzki et al. 2009 among 
others) and academic entrepreneurship (e.g. Thursby and Thursby 2002; Ding and Stuart 
2006, Czarnitzki and Toole 2010). There is little empirical evidence on the effects of 
direct industry funding of university research, especially at the individual faculty level 
rather than at the institutional level. This study aims at filling this gap by studying the 
effects of industry sponsoring on professors’ scientific productivity. Our data contains 
information on laboratory and funding characteristics as well as on publication and patent 
output for 678 professors at 46 different universities in Germany covering a broad range 
of research fields in science and engineering.  
Our results show that a higher budget share from industry reduces publication output of 
professors in terms of both quantity and quality in subsequent years. In turn, industry 
funding has a positive impact on the quality of applied research if measured by patent 
citations. Industry funding may thus still have beneficial effects by improving impact and 
quality of more applied research. Our results have important implications for policy 
makers aiming at encouraging technology transfer between science and industry and for 
public funding authorities. An increasing reliance on industry funding may indeed have an 
impact on the development of science in the long run. 
The following section gives an overview of insights from the literature on industry-science 
links and their impact on academic research and the role of industry funding for 
universities. Section 3 describes our data set. The set-up of our empirical study and the 
results of the econometric analysis are presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
2 Industry-science links and academic performance 
Private sector incentives for engaging in relationships with science can be found in the 
increased speed and scope of technological change and the emergence of complex and 
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multidisciplinary research fields.1 “Science-based technologies" such as biotechnology or 
nanotechnology have further strengthened the role of science for technological innovation. 
Public science provides important knowledge and inputs and organizational pre-conditions 
and reduces the risk for firms to expand in new fields of technology (e.g. Mowery 1998; 
Zucker and Darby 1996; Zucker et al. 2002). Mansfield (1995) argues that firms support 
academic R&D in order to get access to up-to-date knowledge of science and technology. 
He sees the industry’s main interest behind financing public R&D in getting answers to 
specific problems and the conduct of experiments and analyses that their own internal 
R&D lab, if they have one, would not be able to do.  
To stimulate incentives in the scientific sector, reforms of the (legal) research environment 
in the U.S., but also in Europe, were aimed at reducing the (administrative) burden of such 
activities for university researchers. Reforms generally increased commercialization of 
university research. In the U.S., for example, academic patenting soared (Henderson et al. 
1998a,b; Mowery et al. 2001; Sampat 2006).2 Additionally, policies encouraging industry 
funding of academic research such as tax credits (OECD 2002, Bozeman and Gaughan 
2007) and government sponsored programs to support technology partnerships (for 
instance the SBIR in the U.S., see Link and Scott 2005; Audretsch et al. 2002) have been 
installed.  
The increased involvement of university researchers in such activities in general, however, 
has also generated a considerable controversy about the potential long-term effects on the 
future development of scientific knowledge as compared to commercializable 
technologies. These concerns rest on the assumption that there is indeed a trade-off 
between research that is being disclosed in publications and more applied work that is of 
interest for industry (see Rosenberg and Nelson 1994).  
A large body of recent literature, however, has shown that research may result in both 
basic research findings and industrial applications. As argued by Stokes (1997), research 
can be located in “Pasteur’s Quadrant” implying that increased commercial incentives 
may lead to a shift from basic to applied research or from basic to dual-purpose research 
(see also Azoulay et al. 2009; Murray 2002; Levin and Stephan 1991). Sauerman et al. 
                                                 
1 Industry-science links that include collaborative research, contract research and consulting, joint 
development of intellectual property rights as well as spin-off creation and co-operation in graduate 
education and training of employees (Debackere and Veugelers 2005, Czarnitzki 2009). 
2 In the U.S., the Bayh-Dole Act of 1981 was the major reform, whereas in Europe, policy acts had been 
installed two decades later (Mowery et al. 2001, Mowery and and Ziedonis 2002; Sampat 2006; and for 
surveys on the legislative changes and developments in ownership of academic patents in Europe see 
Verspagen 2006; Geuna and Nesta 2006; Dosi et al. 2006; Breschi 2007 and Buenstorf 2009). 
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(2010) suggest that the latter argument could also imply that researchers who were 
engaged in dual-purpose research before do now merely exploit the commercial potential 
of their research without fundamentally changing their research agendas. Rosenberg 
(1998) regards industry contacts as a source of new research ideas and thus argues that 
science can benefit from increased collaboration with industry (see also Mansfield 1995 
and Siegel et al. 1999). Moreover, Azoulay et al. (2009) suggest that researchers benefit 
from the realization of complementarities between basic and applied research that 
otherwise would remain foreclosed. In addition, they point to intra-person economies of 
scope that emerge when a scientist is involved in both the development of academic and 
commercial research outcomes. Furthermore, it has been argued that crowding-out of 
traditional research can be averted if scientists are assisted in their work for industry by 
their university’s technology transfer office (TTO). The involvement of a TTO may 
reduce the individual researchers’ burden and hence leave more time for other research 
projects (Hellman 2007). One of the very few theories in this field has been developed by 
Banal-Estanol and Macho-Stadler (2010). They show that commercial rewards prompt 
researchers to increase the search for (ex post) high quality ideas, which are more likely to 
be generated through (ex ante) riskier research programs. If basic research is associated 
with high uncertainty, this may imply that commercial incentives do not necessarily 
reduce basic research. This does, however, not allow any conclusions with respect to the 
public disclosure of research results. Finally, additional funds from commercial activities 
can be used to hire additional scientists who increase the labs’ overall research outputs for 
both more applied and more basic research for the scientist’s lab.   
Despite these arguments in favor of increased industry-science interaction, critics of this 
development have argued that increased engagement in commercial activities or industry 
involvement alters the traditional incentives in science that were characterized by 
knowledge sharing and rapid disclosure of research outcomes (Dasgupta and David 1994; 
David et al.1992, Florida and Cohen 1999; Nelson 2001). Scientists’ incentives to create 
and immediately publish their research findings are obvious if their careers depend on 
their contributions to science in the form of publications and (graduate) education. The 
possibility to generate additional funds from industry that can be used to improve their 
status at their institution, for example by increasing their lab size, may change these 
incentives.  That financial incentives do play a role for scientists to engage in commercial 
activities has been emphasized by a considerable body of literature (e.g., Ding and Stuart 
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2006; Jensen et al. 2003, Lach and Schankerman 2008).3 Monetary incentives may not 
only affect scientists’ willingness, but also their ability to share information with fellow 
scientists. As a survey described in Thursby and Thursby (2002) documents that firms 
usually require researchers to sign a contract that includes a delay of publication clause 
(see also Louis et al. 2001). Cohen et al. (1994) report that a significant share of industry–
university research centers in the U.S. allows cooperating firms to delete information from 
published reports and the right to delay publication. Further, Trajtenberg et al. (1997) 
argue that inventions that address market demand may not necessarily be close to the 
academic research frontier.  
As knowledge sharing among scientists is the basis for cumulative knowledge production 
and thus for scientific progress (Haeussler et al. 2010), industry funding that affects the 
incentives to share knowledge may have detrimental effects on the development of 
science. Further long-run effects from collaboration with industry may arise from the 
continuous involvement of the professor that has been shown to be necessary for 
university inventions to be successfully commercialized but may distract him from other 
types of research (Jensen and Thursby 2001; see also Agrawal 2006).   
In the light of these arguments on why science may benefit from industry involvement 
such as research funding and why it may not, the net-effects from on science are not 
obvious. 
 
2.1 Empirical Evidence 
While there is hardly any evidence on the direct effects of industry funding on academic 
performance, the effects of particular commercial activities on scientists’ research 
performance have been subject to extensive empirical testing. The most frequently studied 
channels are academic patenting and licensing (see e.g. Azoulay et al. 2009; Henderson et 
al. 1998a,b; Thursby and Thursby 2002), academic entrepreneurship (see e.g. Powers and 
McDougall 2005; Ding and Stuart 2006; Bercovitz and Feldman 2008; Czarnitzki and 
Toole 2010), the engagement in contract research (e.g. Lach and Schankerman 2004; 
Carayol 2007) and research collaboration (e.g. Darby and Zucker; 2001; Zucker et al. 2001, 
2002). 
 
 
                                                 
3 For example, Debackere and Veugelers (2005) show that a larger percentage of licensing income increases 
scientists’ engagement in technology transfer activities (see also Lach and Schankerman 2004). 
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Academic Patenting and Licensing 
It has been argued that patenting may lead to a delay or even a crowing-out of publication 
in academic journals. Numerous studies, however, find a positive correlation between 
academic patenting and journal publications suggesting that publishing and patenting are 
complementary as research outcomes may be disclosed through both mechanisms (Ducor 
2000; Agrawal and Henderson 2002; Mowery et al. 2001; Azoulay et al. 2009; Van Looy 
et al. 2004, 2006; Breschi et al. 2005, 2008; Meyer 2006; Goldfarb et al. 2009; Van Looy 
et al. 2006; Carayol 2007; Stephan et al. 2007; Fabrizio and Minin 2008; Buenstorf 2009). 
Murray (2002), for example, illustrates that scientists may also choose dual-knowledge 
disclosure, i.e. ‘paper-patent pairs’ that are based on the same research outcomes (see also 
Thursby et al. 2007). More recently, there has been some evidence suggesting that 
patenting activities indeed skew scientists’ research toward more commercial priorities 
and that this may delay the public dissemination of research findings. Murray and Stern 
(2007) and Huang and Murray (2009) find that patenting did lead to publication delays 
and thus to a reduction in the use of public knowledge, also labeled as the ”anti-commons 
effect”. Azoulay et al. (2009) analyze the direction and the degree to which faculty 
patenting affects the production of public scientific outputs in terms of their quality, focus 
and content. While they find patents to be positively related to subsequent publication 
rates and quality, they do, however, also observe that patenting induces a shift in research 
content if content is measured by co-authorship with researchers in firms and publications 
in journals that have a higher proportion of company-affiliated authors. Moreover, the 
‘patentability’ of research is found to be higher in the ‘subsequent-to-the-patent papers’ of 
patenting scientists. Fabrizio and DiMinin (2008) narrow the positive effect between 
patenting and publishing down to university patents, but not corporate or unassigned 
patents. They conclude that the observed positive effect in other studies may not be due to 
new ideas stemming from industry contracts but rather to the fact there may be only a 
trade-off between for real commercial patents and not for academic patents in general. The 
authors argue that this effect may be caused by the fact that patents from collaboration 
with industry are more distant from academic science and therefore lead to a stronger 
distraction of the researcher by requiring more time devoted to this type of work. This is in 
line with Trajtenberg et al. (1997) who argue that in terms of technology content, 
corporate patents are more applied and also more incremental as compared to pure 
academic patents and therefore may represent a more significant distraction from 
publication of research results. Buenstorf (2009) also observes that the positive 
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relationship between patents and publications is less clear if the patented invention is 
indeed commercialized. Czarnitzki et al. (2009) likewise stress the importance of 
distinguishing between corporate patents and patents that are assigned to non-profit 
organizations such as universities. Their results for a large sample of German professors 
show that university patents complement academic work in both quantity and quality, 
while corporate patents for which the professor was the inventor are negatively related to 
both output measures.  
Findings by Thursby et al. (2007), who study in a life cycle model the effects of licensing 
on basic research efforts, suggest that licensing indeed creates incentives for applied 
research relative to basic research. However, they conclude that this increase happens at 
the cost of leisure rather than other research efforts. If those outcomes can also be 
published, licensing leads to a higher total research output. However, they also show that 
irrespective of licensing, researchers devote more time to research earlier in their careers 
and that licensing does not affect this fundamental life cycle pattern. 
 
Consulting and contract research 
Thursby et al. (2007) argue that corporate patents with university professors as inventors 
reflect consulting activities. This indicates that if there is a trade-off between patenting 
with industry and time and effort devoted to publishing, contract research will have the 
same effect. Sapsalis et al. (2006) suggest that the yearly amount of contract research at 
the level of the university can be interpreted as a signal for the effectiveness of research 
units (in their study universities) to attract financial resources from industry to conduct 
research. They consider it also as a proxy of more applied research. While Sapsalis et al. 
(2006) find the amount of contract research to be positively related to the size of the 
universities’ patent portfolio, it has not been analyzed how contract research affects the 
production of publishable research outcomes. Carayol (2007) finds a positive relationship 
between the amount of funding for contract research and patenting activities at the level of 
individual researchers. Perkmann and Walsh (2008) distinguish in their conceptual article 
academic consulting according to its motives. They argue that while professors’ research 
productivity may benefit from research-driven consulting, consulting that is mainly driven 
by monetary incentives may have a negative impact as it is not necessarily complementary 
to academic research. Consulting motivated by the commercialization of research results 
again is not expected to be detrimental to future research, but probably has no beneficial 
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effects either. For all types of consulting, the authors do not content a bias in the direction 
of research.  
Most recently, Jensen et al. (2010) investigated the role of professors’ consulting activities 
at eight major U.S. universities. Consulting has been found to be considered more 
important by managers in industry than for example patents (e.g. Cohen et al. 1998). 
Jensen et al.’s results also show that consulting is positively related to government funding 
and university research support. They find that increases in the share of revenue (e.g. from 
licensing) universities allocate to researchers and research infrastructure increase both 
government and industry funding. Although the consequences for academic research are 
not addressed directly, the positive correlation with public funding suggests that 
consulting creates incentives for both pure academic research and research that is of great 
relevance for industry.  
 
Academic entrepreneurship 
While contract research, consulting and (joint) patenting may indeed be “by-products” of 
scientific work and represent successful research, an even stronger case could be made for 
the distraction from scientific research for academics engaging entrepreneurship. Louis et 
al. (1989) distinguish five forms of academic entrepreneurship ranging from “large-scale 
science” to forming of companies. They also consider industry relationships that provide 
new sources of funds as a form of entrepreneurship. From their analysis of surveys 
conducted among U.S. scientists they conclude that entrepreneurial efforts and scientific 
productivity are positively related and that there is no immediate threat from such 
activities for traditional science.   
More recently, Toole and Czarnitzki (2010) reported evidence of a ‘brain drain’ from 
science to industry as academics engage actively in private firms. Such entrepreneurial 
activities come at the cost of the number and quality of journal publications by U.S. life 
scientists. Lowe and Gonzales-Brambila (2007) find on the contrary that faculty 
entrepreneurs are more productive researchers and their output does not decrease after 
firm-founding. However, this does not mean that their output is not lower than it would 
have been without entrepreneurial efforts. 
 
Sponsored Research 
The before mentioned concerns may even be aggravated if industry exerts direct influence 
on scientist research agendas through funding mechanisms. Although consulting and 
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contract research are often the quid pro quo for industry funds, there is only a handful of 
empirical evidence on the effects of industry funding on university research directly. From 
the scientists’ perspective, industry grants provide an attractive source of funds 
supplementing core funding and other public research funds. While government is still the 
main source for universities, the share of industry funding had been increasing since the 
introduction of more structured technology transfer channels and organizational changes 
(see, e.g. Mansfield 1995, Argyres and Liebeskind 1998). In Germany, as in many other 
countries, university scientists usually consider several funding types and the funding is 
often a mix of institutional core-funding and project-based grants (Stephan 1996, Geuna 
2001, Schmoch and Schubert 2009). The latter usually stem from either the national 
government, the States (Bundesländer), grants from the European Union as well as from 
research foundations, or increasingly from the private sector (see Grimpe 2010). Auranen 
and Nieminen (2010) study the effects of recent science policies that strengthen the role of 
competitive funding to increase efficiency of university systems. Besides a comprehensive 
overview on the different funding environments across countries, their results for eight 
OECD countries suggest that the link between financial incentives and scientific output in 
terms of publications is not straight forward and country specific. While they do find a 
higher overall publication output for more competitive funding environments (UK, 
Australia, Finland), they do not find increases in efficiency over time but do observe 
efficiency enhancement in less competitive systems such as Sweden and Germany. Thus, 
their results at least cast some doubts on the belief that competitive funding systems 
promote publication outcome.   
The critical question is thus to what degree increasing industry sponsoring induces a 
“skewing problem”. Does the option to attract industry funding (in addition to the core 
institutional funding) change the incentives of scientists to contribute to public (i.e., non-
excludable) advances in the scientific literature? Slaughter and Leslie (1997), Benner and 
Sandström (2000) and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue that funding influences the 
behavior and outputs of researchers. Even though the relative magnitude of industrial 
funding is not really high, it may be a critical resource influences faculty behavior. There 
may also be a tradeoff between doing research for industry and publishing simply because 
of the time that is consumed by these alternative activities. It may become more attractive 
to spend time doing research that is more aligned to industry interests than more basic 
research. In other words, due to time constraints, researchers’ publishing rates may 
decrease in favor of industry funded projects. Publishing of research results may also be 
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hampered if industry funding has “strings attached” that affect incentives to disclose 
research results for free in academic journals. Geuna (1997) finds that in the U.K., 
industrial funding that is long-term and/or has “no strings attached” is focused on a few 
universities, while a larger number of technology oriented institutions receive the shorter-
term and less basic contracts.  
Blumenthal et al. (1996a, b) and Campbell et al. (2002) report survey-based evidence on 
negative effects from industry sponsoring on the publication of research results, 
knowledge sharing and the speed of knowledge disclosure. Blumenthal et al. (1997) find 
that U.S. academic life scientists had withheld research results due to intellectual property 
rights discussions such as patent applications (see also Louis et al. 2001 and Krimsky 
2003). One of the few studies directly looking at industry funding is Gulbransen and 
Smeby (2005). They find that researchers at Norwegian universities who had grants from 
industry also collaborate more extensively with industry than those without grants or 
contracts. They also study the relationship between industry funding and professors’ self-
assessment of their research focus, i.e. basic, or more applied, and conclude that industrial 
funding is related to applied research, but not to basic research or development. 
Gulbransen and Smeby also find a positive correlation between industry funding and 
scientific productivity, but no correlation between commercial outputs and publications.  
Gulbrandsen and Smeby, however, do neither have information about the amount of 
funding nor on the share of that funding of the entire research budget. They just know 
whether or not someone received funding from industry. Thus, it may be that the 
information of whether or not a professor has funding from industry is insufficient, as the 
number of grants or the relative share of industry funding compared to core funding may 
constitute the critical factor. Behrens and Gray (2001) study effects of different funding 
sources (industry, government and no external sponsor) on a variety of research processes 
and outcomes for graduate students at engineering departments in the U.S. of which 
almost 50% spent most of their time working on a project which was supported by 
industry. The authors argue that most industry support is channeled by cooperative 
research centers where it is complemented by government support. As a consequence, 
total industry support amounts to approximately 20%-25% in the disciplines they study. 
Their findings suggest, however, that although the source of sponsorship and, to a lesser 
degree, the form of sponsorship are associated with a number of differences, these 
differences tend to be minor and related to structural aspects of a student’s research 
involvement and not eventual research outcomes. Bozeman and Gaughan (2007) focus 
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their study on the impact of research grants and contracts on interactive activities with 
industry and find that industry funding strengthens industry-science collaboration. They, 
however, provide no implications of that increased collaboration on scientific 
productivity. Boardman and Ponomarinov (2009) study the effects of industry grants on a 
broad set of indictors. They conclude that additional industry grants increase the 
likelihood of university scientists co-authoring papers with industrial scientists for 
academic journals, however, provide no “before and after” comparison of the university 
researchers’ publication behaviour.  
Van Looy et al. (2004) find no evidence of a skewing problem at the Catholic University 
of Leuven in Belgium. They analyze whether professors with industry contracts publish 
more or less and whether they have different publishing profiles in terms of applied or 
basic research orientation. They find that entrepreneurial activities and publishing are 
positively related. However, selection effects are not controlled for in the study which 
makes it difficult to determine whether industry funding is causal or a reflection of the fact 
that industry selects the most productive researchers. Godin and Gingras (2000) find that 
Canadian university researchers with funding from industry produce more scientific 
publications than their colleagues without such funding. They argue that this may be due 
to the fact that there is no trade-off between many types of contract research and academic 
science, and/or that scientific quality is a prerequisite for attracting such contracts in the 
first place. The latter argument is supported by Grimpe and Fier (2010) who show that 
higher scientific productivity increases the likelihood that academics will transfer research 
outputs to industry, or engage in paid consulting activities for industry. Industry may thus 
not only look at the researchers’ past patenting profile in order to assess their skills but 
also at publications and hence even strengthen the incentives for publishing by creating a 
signal of the scientist’s quality.4 Geuna and Nesta (2006) argue that only the best 
researchers will be able to achieve both high academic and commercially productivity.  
In summary, while the role of particular forms of technology transfer channels appear to 
be quite well understood, the effects of industry funding are not as clear. Looking at the 
financial dimension of industry science links may reveal a more nuanced picture of 
consequences for scientists’ productivity in the traditional sense.  
Cohen et al. (2002) find the most important channel for knowledge transfer from science 
to industry to be the publication of research results. Narin et al. (1997) show that the 
                                                 
4 See also Zucker and Darby (1996) and Zucker et al. (2002) who show that for star scientist’s involvement 
in biotechnological research, particularly high publication records seem to have qualified the scientists as 
attractive research partners. 
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number of references to scientific publications in patents has almost tripled during the 
nineties, documenting the increased value of scientific output for commercial innovation. 
Thus, if industry funding reduces publications, not only the development of science could 
be impeded, but also technology transfer. Transfer may be strengthened between the 
university and the firms providing funds, but may be reduced for all the others. 
This study aims to shed light on the impact of private sector research sponsoring on 
professors’ scientific achievements. If such funding accounts for a significant share of the 
faculties’ budgets, scientists’ research agendas may be skewed towards such commercial 
priorities or industry interests. One the other hand, industry contracts may be a source of 
ideas and improve patenting, publishing or even both.  
3 Data 
The empirical analysis of this paper is based on a unique dataset that had been created 
from different data sources. The core data had been collected by a survey among research 
units at German higher education institutions in the fields of science or engineering, i.e. 
physics, mathematics and computer science, chemistry and pharmaceuticals, biology and 
life sciences, electrical and mechanical engineering and other engineering and related 
fields such as geosciences. In spring 2000 the Centre for European Economic Research 
(ZEW, Mannheim) conducted a survey among a random sample of research units 
(stratified by regions). The questionnaire addressed “head of departments”, in general full 
professors who have budget and personnel responsibility.5 The survey addressed research 
units at general universities, technical universities and polytechnic colleges (“universities 
of applied sciences”).  
The German public research system also comprises non-university institutions such as 
Fraunhofer Society, Max-Planck Society, HGF Association of German Research Centers 
and WGL Science Association, to name only the four largest associations of publicly 
funded research institutes. The original survey also addressed public non-profit research 
institutions such as Fraunhofer or Max-Planck institutes. We do not consider these 
institutions in our analysis as they differ substantially from research units at universities 
and polytechnics, for instance with respect to the fact that there is no teaching, no graduate 
education and the organizational structure is different from the three types of universities. 
General universities have both a research and an education mission within one 
organizational unit. They account for the lion’s share of total R&D expenditure on public 
                                                 
5 Usually a chair has only one professor. Larger universities, however, may also have several professors at 
one chair. Nevertheless, only one is the head of the department. 
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research in Germany with about 45%. Technical Universities (TUs) specialize in science 
and engineering and account for about 7% of total public R&D. Universities of Applied 
Sciences (UaS) account for about 2% (Czarnitzki and Rammer 2003). Most of the latter 
were founded in the 1970’s and their initial scope barely included research activities, but 
mainly teaching. Nowadays, however, they are increasingly playing a major role in the 
fields of applied research and development. Unlike traditional universities, however, 
polytechnic colleges are usually not foreseen to engage in post-graduate education and are 
also not allowed to confer doctoral degrees (for further details see BMBF 2010). 
The overall response rate to the survey was 24.4% providing us with information on 724 
different professors and their research teams. After the elimination of incomplete records, 
our final sample contains 678 professor-research unit observations from 46 different 
institutions of which 56% are universities, 23% are TUs and 21% are UaS.  For each of 
the 16 German States (Länder), the sample comprises at least one observation (see Table 
A.2 for details). The key variables of interest are obtained directly from the survey. The 
professors were asked to indicate the amount and composition of “third-party funding”6 
that they received during 1999 in addition to their core funding as a share of their total 
budget. In the final sample more than 61% of the professors received funds from industry. 
The amount of industry funding and its share of the total budget (INDFUND) at the level of 
the research unit differ between the types of institutions (see Table 1). The share of 
research grants from public sources of total budget (GOVFUND) is comparable between 
universities and technical universities, but considerably lower at UaS.  
TUs show the highest share with 10.6% of their total budget which amounts to more than 
160 thousand Euros on average in the year of the survey. The average number of staff per 
research unit (LABSIZE) is about 20 (median 13). The teams are slightly larger at technical 
universities compared to non-technical universities. UaS show significantly smaller 
numbers. The share of team members with a non-scientific, but technical background 
(TECHS) is larger than a quarter at UaS and thereby also larger at both techs and 
universities. Also the share of people in the team with a PhD (POSTDOCS) is largest at UaS. 
This, however, is due to the smaller overall team size and the lack of doctoral students. 
We know from the survey whether the professor had contact to his institution’s 
Technology Transfer Office (TTO). As it is conceivable that such contacts may impact both 
stronger technology transfer awareness and the time burden of such activities, it may also 
have effects on patenting and publishing activities. At universities, only two thirds of the 
                                                 
6 See Schmoch and Schubert (2009) for details on “third-party funds” (Drittmittel) in Germany.  
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professors had contacts to the TTO compared to 79% at TUs and 87% at UaS. The number 
of female professors is negligible with only 22 of the 678 professors in or sample being 
female.  
 
3.1 Publication and Patent data 
As we are interested in the scientific performance at the level of the individual researcher, 
or more precisely at the level of the head of the research unit, we supplemented the survey 
data with publication and patent information. We use the publication and patent output of 
the responding professor as a proxy for the research output of his research unit.7 The data 
base of the German Patent and Trademark Office (DPMA) contains all patents filed with 
the DPMA. Since applicants are obliged by law to disclose the name of the inventor in the 
patent application, we searched through this database for all patents which listed 
professors from our sample as inventors. One technique for measuring the quality or 
impact of patents is patent citation analysis. There are basically two types of citations on a 
patent. First, citations of other patents by the inventor (or the applicant) and citations 
added by the examiner of the patent application. We focus on “forward citations” to the 
patents, defined as the number of citations received by each patent following its issue. 
Patent forward citations have been proved to be a suitable measure for the quality, 
importance or significance of a patented invention and have been used in various studies 
(see e.g. Henderson et al. 1998a; Hall et al. 2001b; Trajtenberg 2001 or Czarnitzki et al. 
2008). The publication histories of the professors were traced in the ISI Web of Science® 
database of Thomson-Scientific (Philadelphia, PA, USA) which provides data on 
publications in scientific journals and bibliometric indicators. Thomson Scientific 
identifies and indexes a broad range of journals in all areas of the sciences, social sciences, 
and arts and humanities. The database covers all significant document types within these 
journals including articles, letters, notes, corrections, additions, excerpts, editorials and 
reviews. Records contain information such as the title, authors, keywords, cited 
references, abstracts and other document details. We searched for publications (articles, 
notes, reviews and letters) of professors in our sample through the ISI Web of Knowledge® 
platform by their name and subsequently filtered results on the basis of affiliations, 
addresses and journal fields. In order to assign the publications correctly to the professor, 
                                                 
7 Even though we do know the number of each chair’s employees and details on their qualification, we do 
not have further details (e.g. sex, name) of the individual team members. Thus, we cannot collect publication 
and patent information at the team member level. 
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we also collected information of their career paths that allowed us to relate publication 
records to professors even if the affiliation on the publication did not correspond to the 
current one. The publication record in the database also contains the number of citations 
that each publication received. We use the citation counts, i.e. the number of forward 
citations to those publications as indication of publication quality or impact of each 
professor. Several authors have shown, that - despite some limitations -  citation counts 
are an adequate indicator to evaluate research output (e.g. Baird and Oppenheim 1994; 
Garfield and Welljams-Dorof 1992).8  
Since we are interested in the professors’ publication and patent track record and the 
respective citation counts before the survey as well as in their performance in the years 
after, we collect all patents and publications from the professor’s first entry until the end 
of 2007. The number of past publications depends of course on the academic experience 
or seniority of the researcher. To control for differences in experience, we therefore 
gathered information from the German National Library on the year in which the 
professors received their PhDs.9 From this information, we calculate the years of the 
professors’ experience (EXPERIENCE) in academia. Although our professors are all rather 
senior (and tenured) academic staff heading a research unit, we still want to control for life 
cycle effects as publication output has been shown to depend on the position in the 
academic life cycle (see e.g. Thursby et al. 2007). The average professor had been 
working for 22 years since receiving his PhD when filling out the survey in the year 2000 
(median is 22, too). This relatively high level of experience is of course due to the fact that 
the survey targeted “head of research units”. However, for a few professors, who 
according to their CVs either obtained their doctoral degree abroad or do not have a 
PhD10, we used the year of their first publication as a proxy for the beginning of their 
academic career. If professors with very common names like “Müller” or “Fischer” and 
also common first names appeared in our dataset, we preferred to drop these observations 
                                                 
8 The popular impact factor of the journal in which the article was published would have also been available, 
but since we study different fields of science, the journal impact factors have been shown to be not 
appropriate (see Amin and Mabe 2000). 
9 In Germany a dissertation needs to be published in the German National Library (Deutsche 
Nationalbibliothek). This central archival library among other things, collects, permanently archives, 
comprehensively documents and records bibliographically all German and German-language publications 
from 1913 onwards. 
10 Some Professors in our sample who are employed at UaS may not necessarily have a doctoral degree nor 
have they gone through the procedure of habilitation or junior professor. At UaS these qualifications are not 
compulsory for becoming professor. Candidates can apply for the position after their doctorate or in some 
cases a diploma is already sufficient if the person has gained research experience in industry for several 
years. 
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from our dataset since publication and/or patent data could not be uniquely identified for 
them. For our main analysis, we limited the time horizon for publications, patents and 
citations to the period from 1994 to 200711. We thus fixed the “activity window” to six 
years before (1994-1999) and the eight years after the survey (2000-2007). In the former 
period, professors at universities on average published 16 items, professors at TUs about 6 
and UaS professors 2. While we find high citations counts for university publications, the 
‘times cited’ for the other two categories is much lower (344 compared to 128 and 23, 
respectively). This is also reflected in the average number of citations per publication 
although the difference between universities and technical universities is much smaller 
(see Table 1). For patent applications, the picture is less diverse across types of 
institutions.  The average number of patent applications is 1.54 for university patents, 1.27 
for patents from technical universities and 1.20 from UaS. Patents from technical 
universities are, however, cited more frequently. In our data, a relatively small number of 
university professors are responsible for the majority of publications. 14% of the professor 
published nearly 50% of the total number of publications. The same is true for citations: 
there are very few highly cited professors, 11% with more than 1,000 total citations or 
more than 40 citations per paper.  This pattern is characteristic for publication output (see 
e.g. Kyvik 1991, 2003). For patent applications and citations, we find a similar picture. 
45% have not applied for a patent at all. From the total of 3,079 patent applications, 10% 
of the professors account for a quarter of these patents. The fact that not all patent 
applications are usually successful has to be taken into account while looking at the mean 
of patent forward citations which indicates that 67.7% of the patents received no forward 
citation at all. The average number of application among those with at least one patent is 6 
with a maximum of 67 patent applications in the period 1994-2007. 
Looking at industry funding by research fields shows that it is highest in engineering, in 
particular for mechanical engineering with more than 240.000€ or about 14% of their total 
budget. The distribution of industry funds, however, is skewed (the median for mechanical 
engineering is about 88.000€ and 10% of total budget). The share of industry funding is 
lowest in physics and mathematics which is probably due to the rather theoretical research 
orientation of many professors in these fields (Table 2). Looking at research productivity 
by fields illustrates that in chemistry, physics, and biology, professors published most and 
                                                 
11 We also tested the robustness of the results to a model specification with all publications and patents from 
the first publication or patent found in the data base. The main results remained unchanged. See Table A.1 in 
the appendix for descriptive statistics on publication and patent output over the professor’s entire academic 
life time.     
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also received a larger number of citations per publication compared to mechanical or 
electrical engineering. Patenting activity is highest among electrical engineers and as 
expected lowest among mathematicians and computer scientists both in terms of patent 
application as well as in terms of citations that their patents receive (Table 3).    
 
Table 1: Funding and scientific productivity (variable means by type of institution) 
Description Variable Uni TU UaS
Funding  
Amount Ind. Funding (T €) 98.044 168.463 61.735
Share of Ind. Funding in % of 
Total Budget  INDFUND 7.60 10.56 9.29
Amount Gov. Grants (T €)  181.56 192.07   11.53
Share of Gov. Grants in % of Total 
Budget GOVFUND 26.64 25.04 6.11
Scientific Output 1994-1999  
Publications  PUB1994-2007 16.35 6.46 2.28
Citation Count of Publications CITPUB1994-2007 344.77 128.17 22.82
Average Citations per Publication  CITperPUB1994-2007 15.44 7.52 4.67
Patents  PAT1994-2007 1.54 1.27 1.20
Citation Count of Patents  CITperPAT1994-2007 16.25 35.61 12.77
Average Citations per Patent CITPAT1994-2007 3.81 4.23 3.71
Scientific Output 2000-2007  
Publications  PUB2000-2007 26.24 13.34 2.99
Citation Count of Publications CITPUB2000-2007 256.73 124.17 15.76
Average Citations per Publication  CITperPUB2000-2007 7.46 3.57 1.85
Patents  PAT2000-2007 1.44 1.20 1.28
Citation Count of Patents CITPAT2000-2007 1.02 1.17 1.17
Average Citations per Patent CITperPAT2000-2007 0.23 0.24 0.10
Controls  
Number of people at lab  LABSIZE 21.38 24.31 15.73
Number of years since PhD  EXPERIENCE 22.57 24.46 16.32
Contact to TTO dummy TTO 0.66 0.79 0.87
% technical employees  TECHS 7.01 7.85 19.87
% employees with PhD  POSTDOCS 22.54 19.52 25.50
Female Professor dummy GENDER 0.03 0.03 0.04
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Table 2: Funding by Research Field 
Field Freq. % 
Amount of 
Industry 
Funding (T €) 
% Ind. 
Funding  
of Total 
Budget 
     
Physics 104 15.34 47.52 4.32 
Mathematics and     
     Computer Science 107 15.78 39.09 5.95 
Chemistry 95 14.01 68.05 6.06 
Biology  58 8.55 28.70 7.46 
Electrical Engineering 101 14.90 130.75 11.54 
Mechanical Engineering 110 16.22 241.43 14.13 
Other Engineering 103 15.19 150.48 10.13 
 678 100.00   
 
 
 
Table 3: Scientific Productivity by Research Field 
 
Publica-
tions 
 
Citation 
Count 
 
Citations 
per 
publication 
Patents 
 
Citation 
Count  
 
Citations 
per patent 
Field Publications 1994-1999 Patents 1994-1999 
Physics 22.47 612.89 21.74 1.11 17.11 2.97
Mathematics and      
  Computer Science 3.97 44.49 6.57 0.21 0.84 0.56 
Chemistry 27.53 513.24 16.07 1.80 23.24 5.47
Biology 11.52 320.59 21.83 0.91 7.60 3.67
Electrical Engineering 3.93 53.88 5.62 2.27 33.74 7.28
Mechanical Engineering 3.46 28.12 4.99 1.84 39.69 5.65
Other Engineering 6.94 93.62 7.97 1.57 12.33 1.70
 Publications 2000-2007 Patents 2000-2007 
Physics 33.29 419.68 9.45 0.91 1.06 0.20
Mathematics and      
  Computer Science 6.50 39.54 3.61 0.25 0.08 0.02 
Chemistry 39.06 376.64 8.40 1.52 0.67 0.13
Biology  19.45 247.71 9.26 1.14 0.76 0.15
Electrical Engineering 11.58 84.04 3.00 1.90 2.11 0.45
Mechanical Engineering 6.54 24.91 2.31 1.91 0.91 0.26
Other Engineering 15.33 94.94 3.78 1.79 0.84 0.20
 
In our sample, we find that there are three types of scientists. First, purist researchers who 
did neither file patents nor received industry funding (27%). The finding that almost half 
of our professors never patent is in line with findings by Agrawal and Henderson (2002) 
who report similar numbers for faculty at MIT. A second group of professors may be 
named “commercialists”. They engage actively in patenting and receive a substantial share 
of their budget from industry funding (INDFUND > 10% and at least 3 patent applications 
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between 1994 and 2007, 11%). These professors publish below average (on average 9 
publication from 1994-1999 and about 19 from 2000-2007). Third, the sample comprises a 
considerable number of researchers in between the two extremes.  
3.2 The abolishment of the Professors’ Patent Privilege 
As our sample comprises patent applications before and after 2002, we cannot get away 
without discussing the potential impact of a legal reform that abolished a special clause in 
the law on employee inventions and came into force in February 2002 
(Arbeitnehmererfindungs-Gesetz, ArbEG, 2002). Prior to this reform university 
researchers were exempted from the general obligation of employees to disclose job-
related inventions to their employers and could thus keep the ownership of their patents. 
University inventors could thus freely decide whether and through what channel to apply 
for patents (university-owned, firm-owned or individually-owned). The Professors’ 
Privilege was abandoned because it was regarded as hampering science and technology 
transfer activities. While in the years after the Bayh-Dole Act12, U.S. university patent 
applications escalated, von Ledebur et al. (2009) find no such evidence for Germany. 
They show that the overall numbers of university-invented patents in Germany increased 
after 2002, but attribute this to the direct effect of the reform due to the fact that patents 
are now assigned to universities instead of to the professors themselves. They do not find 
an overall increase in the number of patents originating from German universities. They 
attribute this result to three circumstances. First, some universities already had established 
a technology transfer infrastructure before 2002, and a substantial number of patents were 
owned by universities before the reform probably due to the uncertain and costly nature of 
patenting. Moreover, before German reunification, East Germany did not have a 
professors’ privilege. As a consequence, patenting experience differed substantially 
among German professors. Finally, in the pre-2002 years professors frequently did not 
apply for a patent in their own name, but the application was made by a private-sector 
firm, particularly if the invention was based on prior research collaboration. As thus the 
reform basically led to a shift in the ownership of the patents, but not in its numbers, it 
should not affect our data because we looked up patents based on academic investors not 
applicants. Moreover, a substitution of university ownership for firm ownership of patents 
(if the patent was the result of paid contract research and therefore belongs to a firm) 
                                                 
12 In the U.S., the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 set out rules for universities to seek IPR protection for university-
inventions that resulted from publicly funded research. This system followed a rather complex regime of 
bilateral contracts and case-by-case arrangements (e.g. Mowery and Sampat 2001). 
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should not affect our results as we take the overall count and not just university owned 
patents in which the scientist is mentioned as inventor. 
4 Empirical Analysis 
Primarily, our analysis aims to shed light on the effects of industry funding on scientific 
productivity. As potential effects are unlikely to show up immediately, we observe the 
scientific output up to eight years after the survey. We thus expect journal publication 
output and patent applications in the post-survey period 2000-2007 to be a function of the 
share of industry funding (INDFUND) and public grants (GOVFUND) the professors received 
for their research unit, their past publication and patenting efforts (PUB1995-1999, PAT1995-
1999 as past performance is likely to affect future performance due to a „cumulative 
advantage“), their lab size (LABSIZE), their experience (EXPERIENCE), the skill composition 
at the lab in terms of the percentage of technical employees (TECHS) and post doctoral 
researchers (POSTDOCS). In addition, we consider further attributes such as the research 
field, the type of institution and gender. 
Figure 1 depicts the development of industry funding for all German higher education 
institutions in the period 2000-2007 that is not covered by the survey. Compared to the 
year 2000, the amount has increased by more than 40%. Remarkably, the institutions’ core 
funding has been decreasing since 2002, while total budgets remained largely unchanged. 
Concerns raised by Lee (1996) regarding the effects of industry involvement in science on 
long-term, disinterested, fundamental research in the light of ‘declining federal R&D 
support’ in the U.S. can thus be raised here as well. Unfortunately, the information on 
industry funding in the survey is limited to the year 1999. Data at the institutional level (as 
shown in Figure 1) documents an increase at the aggregate level in the post-survey years. 
This leads us to regard the survey-numbers for 1999 at the research unit level as “lower 
bound” of the industry funding received by the research unit in subsequent years. Public 
grants increased likewise which confirms Auranen and Nieminen (2010), who report a 
development towards a more competitive funding structure. GOVFUND is included to 
control for a professor’s success in attracting public funds. 
Additionally, as publication or patent output may not only be affected in terms of quantity, 
but also quality, we estimate the effects on citation counts (CITPUB, CITPAT) and average 
citations per publication and patent (CITperPUB, CITperPAT), respectively.   
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Figure 1: University Funding (% changes relative to the year 2000) 
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Source: DESTATIS, series 11, issue 4.3.2, own calculations. 
 
4.1 Econometric set-up 
The number of publications and patent applications is restricted to non-negative integer 
values and also characterized by many zeros, since not all of the professors in our sample 
show a positive number of publications and/or patents.  The same applies for the number 
of citations for both measures. Hence, in order to investigate the relationship between 
funding and research output, we estimate count data models. This leads to the following 
estimation equation which is assumed to be of an exponential functional form: 
 2000 2007 1999 1999      'it i , i , it i i it iE Y | Z ,X ,c exp Z X c    
where Yi is the count variable and stands either for publication counts (PUB), publication 
citations (CITPUB), patent applications (PAT), patent citations (CITPAT) or citations per item 
(CITperPUB, CITperPAT) by scientist i within the time span 2000 until 2007 which is 
assumed to be Poisson distributed with it > 0. Zi,1999 denotes the share of industry funding 
(INDFUND) in the survey’s reference year 1999. Xit represents the set of controls including 
the share of public grants (GOVFUND),  and  are the parameters to be estimated. ci is the 
individual specific unobserved effect, such as individual skills of each scientist or their 
attitude towards publishing or patenting.  
Usually, cross-sectional count data models are estimated by applying Poisson and negative 
binomial regression models (negbin). A basic assumption of the Poisson model is 
equidispersion, i.e. the equality of the conditional mean and the conditional variance 
 22
which is typically violated in applications leading to overdispersion. This led researchers 
to the use of the negbin model since it allows for overdispersion.  Although the negbin 
model relaxes this assumption of equidispersion, it is only consistent (and efficient) if the 
functional form and distributional assumption of the variance term is correctly specified. 
For the Poisson model, however, it has been shown that it is consistent solely under the 
assumption that the mean is correctly specified even if overdispersion is present (Poisson 
Pseudo (or Quasi) Maximum likelihood). In case the assumption of equidispersion is 
violated and hence the obtained standard errors are too small, this can be corrected by 
using fully robust standard errors (see Wooldridge 2002), which is what we do. 
A major drawback of our cross-sectional dataset is that it usually does not allow to control 
for unobserved heterogeneity which is most likely to be present in our data. Hence, if 
unobserved effects like, e.g., specific skills of each scientist are positively correlated with 
the right hand side variables, such as industry funding, the estimated coefficient of the 
industry funding variable is upwards biased.  
A solution is provided by the linear feedback model suggested by Blundell et al. (1995, 
2002) who argue that the main source of unobserved heterogeneity lies in the different 
values of the dependent variable Yi with which observation units (professors, in our case) 
enter the sample. The model approximates the unobserved heterogeneity by including the 
log of the Yi from a pre-sample period average in a standard pooled cross-sectional model 
(ln[PUB_MEAN], ln[PAT_MEAN] etc.). In case Yi is zero in the pre-sample period, e.g. a 
professor had no publications, a dummy is used to capture the “quasi-missing” value in 
log Yi of in the pre-sample period (d[PUB_MEAN = 0], d[PAT_MEAN = 0] etc). We constructed 
the pre-sample mean estimator by using six pre-sample observations values of Y for 1994 
to 1999. 
 
4.2 Results  
Table 4 presents the results of the Poisson regressions on the publication output indicators. 
The effect of INDFUND is significantly negative for both the publication count and the 
citations count and citations per publication in the years after the survey. That is, a higher 
share of industry funding (in 1999) leads to a lower publication output in subsequent years 
(2000-2007) both in terms of quantity and quality. To be more precise, an additional 
percentage point of in the share industry funding of total budget reduces publication 
output by 0.8%. This implies an average loss of one publication for a 5.5% increase in 
industry funding (that on average about 6000 €) in the following 8 years. This effect 
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becomes more pronounced if we look at the indicators referring to publication quality. The 
number of citations decreases 1.3% (and 1.6% fixed effects model) and the number of 
citations per publication is reduced by 1.3% in both specifications. The share of public 
research grants (GOVFUND) on the other hand has a positive and significant effect on 
publication output both in terms of publication count and citations per publication. This 
effect, however, is not robust to the fixed effects specification.  
Table 5 depicts the results from the patent equation. Interestingly, a higher share of 
industry funding has no effect on the number of patents, but does have a positive impact 
on patent citations and citations per patent. That is an increase of 2.6% (2.5% in the model 
with fixed effects) with each additional percentage point sponsored by the private sector. 
As patents can only receive citations if they were granted, the positive effect here can also 
be interpreted as a novelty and quality effect of industry funds on professors’ patents. 
Unlike in the publication model, where past publication record was significant but not past 
patenting activity, the patent equation shows that both past publications and past patent 
applications significantly determine future patent outcome. Public grants, on the contrary, 
have no impact on future patent activity.  
To sum up, depending on the expression of Yi, we find that: 
1.  <0 if  
 Yi denotes publication counts (PUB), the total number of citations to 
publications (CITPUB) or the average number of citations per publication 
(CITperPUB) 
2.  =0 if 
 Yi stands for patent applications (PAT)  
3.  >0 if  
 Yi stands for patent citations (CITPAT) or the average number of citations 
per publication (CITperPUB). 
The main results are robust to the inclusion of the fixed ‘effect’ in the linear feedback 
model. It should be noted that we also tested a non-linear specification, i.e. we included 
the squared value of INDFUND to test whether the negative (or positive effect in the patent 
citation equations) effect of INDFUND may only occur up from a certain level of industry 
funding. The inclusion of INDFUND2, however, did not affect the significance of INDFUND, 
but it was never significant itself. The institution type (Uni, TU, UaS) dummies are jointly 
significant in the publication equations, but not in the patent equations. Generally, 
publications were significantly lower at TUs and UaS compared to universities that served 
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as reference category. The research field dummies are in all models jointly significant 
(except in the CITperPUB fixed effect specification) capturing differences in publication 
patterns among research fields. The contact to a TTO has a positive impact on patent 
citations. We do not observe any “age”-related effects which is not surprising since the 
professors in our sample are quite homogenous in their level of experience.  
5 Conclusions 
While from a private-sector perspective, the benefits from collaborating with academia are 
found to be unambiguously positive, the effects on the scientific sector were not as clear 
cut. We began this paper with observations on the substantial growth in industry funding 
of public R&D. This study aimed at filling a gap in the literature by providing insights on 
the effects of industry funding for public research. Our results suggest that the share of 
industry funding of total budget has reached a point (already in 1999 and shares have been 
increasing ever since) that is sufficiently high to negatively affect publication output. In 
other words, professors in our sample publish less the higher the share of industry funds 
relative to their total budget. This finding supports the “skewing problem” hypothesis. If 
information sharing among scientists via publications is the basis for cumulative 
knowledge production and thus for scientific progress (see e.g. Stephan 1996; Haeussler et 
al. 2010), industry funding that reduces publications may have detrimental effects on the 
development of science. On the other hand, we find that a higher share of industry funding 
does not impact the number of patent applications on which the respective professor is 
listed as inventor. We do, however, observe a significant positive effect on their impact in 
terms of forward citations to those patents. This effect can also be interpreted as a quality 
indicator as naturally only granted patents can receive citations. Thus, industry financing 
may increase the likelihood of an academic patent being granted. Mansfield (1996) argued 
that the number of (patent) citations received by a university is influenced by the amount 
of R&D performed by that university in the relevant field of science. The latter is in turn 
determined by the amount of industry financing received. In our setting, the result that 
patents citations increase if the share of industry funding is relatively higher confirms this 
preposition. Patents of professors whose research is supported by industry may not only be 
more successful in the granting process but also more visible and relevant for further 
applications in industry, hence receive more forward citations.  
Thus, whereas industry funding indeed reduces research that is published in academic 
journals, it may still have beneficial effects with respect to applied research. It remains 
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therefore the responsibility of public funding agencies to provide the funds for sustaining 
or improving research output that is freely disclosed in publications. We believe the 
results from this study are provocative for policy analysis and public funding authorities. 
An increasing reliance on industry funding compared to stagnating core funding may 
indeed affect the development of science in the long run if publication output is reduced. 
On the other hand, industry funding may be very valuable for professors’ applied research 
and the success of their patenting activities.  
Despite all efforts, our study is not without some limitations and the results presented 
ought to be interpreted with those caveats in mind. It could be argued that there is a bias in 
direction of above-average performers as our sample comprises information on “heads of 
research units” only. These academics must have performed well in their past carrier in 
order to hold such a position at all. Additionally, it might be that our data does not cover 
all the scientists’ publications. Although the ISI publication database is quite 
comprehensive, it does not contain all journals in all fields. From the funding perspective, 
we do neither know from how many firms nor from which funding had been obtained. 
Further, we can not make any judgment on the effects on research content. Future research 
could assess the effects on the scientists’ research content measured by changes in journal 
types and patent classifications. Additional insights into the professors’ patent activity 
could be gained from studying the type of citations to patents and their technology 
classifications. Such detailed information would allow statements regarding a shift in 
research content caused by increased industry funding for such research. Studying a 
sample of professors that are less homogenous in terms of their level of experience could 
also reveal interesting results that have remained foreclosed in our study. Researchers at 
earlier stages of their career may be led by other incentives that for instance increase their 
paper output despite of industry funding. Finally, it would have been interesting to study 
effects of industry funding at a more disaggregate level. The effects on scientific 
productivity are very likely to depend on both the institutional setting (university 
provisions to support such activities) as well as on the actual activity that had been 
sponsored. Perhaps even more importantly, the extent to which more traditional scientific 
activities are affected will certainly depend on what industry expects in return for their 
sponsoring. In other words, an analysis of “sponsoring firms and sponsored academics”-
pairs would be valuable to refine the insights from this study.    
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Table 4: Estimation results (678 obs.) on publication output (with INDFUND) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust, all models contain a constant, field and institution type dummies.  
 CITperPUB and CITperPAT for models in columns 3 and 6. Pre-sample dummies d[X_MEAN] for observations with zero means are 
not presented. *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
 Poisson Model Poisson Model with Fixed Effects 
Variable PUB CITPUB CITperPUB PUB CITPUB  CITperPUB
INDFUND  -0.008 ** -0.013** -0.013*** -0.008 **    -0.016***  -0.012*** 
 (0.004) (0.006)   (0.005)   (0.003)    (0.006)    (0.005)    
GOVFUND   0.007 ***  0.005    0.005**  0.004   0.002      0.003
 (0.002) (0.003)   (0.002)   (0.002) (0.003)    (0.002)
PUB1995-1999   0.013 ***               
 (0.002)               
PAT1995-1999   0.012               
 (0.011)               
CITPUB1995-1999    0.001***  0.014***           
  (0.000)   (0.002)             
CITPAT1995-1999  -0.000   -0.003**           
  (0.001)   (0.002)             
LABSIZE   0.123 *  0.366***  0.103*   0.111 **    0.165**   -0.042    
 (0.069) (0.102)   (0.057)   (0.057)    (0.065)    (0.052)    
LABSIZE2  -0.000 -0.000** -0.000   -0.000    -0.000     -0.000    
 (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
EXPERIENCE  -0.042 -0.027    0.015   -0.054     -0.038     -0.001    
 (0.037) (0.034)   (0.020)   (0.034)    (0.028)    (0.020)    
EXPERIENCE2   0.000 -0.000   -0.000    0.001      0.000     -0.000    
 (0.001) (0.001)   (0.000)   (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.000)    
TTO   0.215 *  0.049    0.136    0.130      0.096      0.180**  
 (0.129) (0.138)   (0.089)   (0.119)    (0.118)    (0.091)    
TECHS   0.003  0.007    0.000    0.005      0.008      0.004    
 (0.007) (0.010)   (0.004)   (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.004)    
POSTDOCS   0.002 -0.004   -0.004   -0.000     -0.009***  -0.004   
 (0.004) (0.005)   (0.002)   (0.004)    (0.003)    (0.002)    
GENDER   0.017 -0.204   -0.203    0.136     -0.078     -0.220    
 (0.194) (0.279)   (0.193)   (0.156)    (0.248)    (0.208)    
ln[PUB MEAN]    0.601 ***        
       (0.053)           
ln[PAT MEAN]        0.057           
       (0.068)           
ln[CITPUB MEAN]    -0.163*** 
   (0.048)    
ln[CITPAT MEAN]     0.643*** 
   (0.047)    
ln[CITperPUB MEAN]       0.277*** 
        (0.033)    
ln[CITperPAT MEAN]         -0.044    
     (0.030)    
Log-Likelihood -6,379.11 -63,901.38 -2,308.94 -5,348.40 -44,018.36 -2,208.85 
Joint sign. inst. dum. χ2 (2) 80.53*** 43.86*** 22.71*** 38.26*** 16.05*** 10.99*** 
Joint sign. field dum. χ2 (6) 57.36*** 95.66*** 39.32*** 16.24** 14.15** 8.07 
McFadden's R2 0.487 0.603 0.337 0.570 0.727 0.366 
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Table 5: Estimation results (678 obs.) on patent output (with INDFUND) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust, all models contain a constant, field and institution type dummies.  
 CITperPUB and CITperPAT for models in columns 3 and 6. Pre-sample dummies d[X_MEAN] for observations with zero means are not 
presented. *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
 
 Poisson Model Poisson Model with Fixed Effects 
Variable PUB CITPUB CITperPUB PUB CITPUB  CITperPUB
INDFUND   0.003      0.026**  0.028*** -0.002     0.024 *      0.028** 
 (0.005)     (0.011)   (0.010)   (0.006)   (0.016)     (0.013)   
GOVFUND   0.003  -0.003   -0.001    0.003  -0.004  -0.002   
 (0.004)  (0.011)   (0.008)   (0.004) (0.013) (0.008)   
PUB1995-1999   0.009 ***               
 (0.003)                  
PAT1995-1999   0.099 ***               
 (0.012)                  
CITPUB1995-1999        0.000*** -0.002            
      (0.000)   (0.006)            
CITPAT1995-1999       0.000    0.002            
      (0.000)   (0.004)            
LABSIZE   0.157      0.540*   0.492**  0.115     0.464 *      0.405** 
 (0.118)     (0.317)   (0.220)   (0.102)   (0.325)     (0.204)   
LABSIZE2  -0.000     -0.000   -0.000   -0.000 *   -0.000       0.000   
 (0.000)     (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)     (0.000)   
EXPERIENCE  -0.039      0.097    0.088   -0.049     0.150       0.111   
 (0.064)     (0.104)   (0.075)   (0.050)   (0.111)     (0.083)   
EXPERIENCE2   0.000     -0.003   -0.002    0.000    -0.004      -0.002   
 (0.001)     (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.001)   (0.003)     (0.002)   
TTO   0.269      1.176***  0.494    0.099     0.937 **     0.335   
 (0.345)     (0.364)   (0.450)   (0.330)   (0.394)     (0.464)   
TECHS   0.001      0.005    0.013   -0.001     0.004       0.008   
 (0.006)     (0.011)   (0.011)   (0.005)   (0.012)     (0.010)   
POSTDOCS   0.006     -0.005    0.002    0.007    -0.003       0.003   
 (0.006)     (0.013)   (0.009)   (0.005)   (0.015)     (0.011)   
GENDER   0.179     -2.131*** -2.925***  0.341    -2.255 ***  -2.977***
 (0.331)     (0.826)   (0.871)   (0.225)   (0.636)     (0.681)   
ln[PUB MEAN]    0.032          
       (0.075)          
ln[PAT MEAN]         0.523 ***        
        (0.088)          
ln[CITPUB MEAN]      0.198 **     
    (0.087)       
ln[CITPAT MEAN]      0.259 **     
    (0.136)       
ln[CITperPUB MEAN]        0.195*  
      (0.101)   
ln[CITperPAT MEAN]        0.090   
       (0.088)   
Log-Likelihood -1,343.47 -1,318.19 -348.20 -1,173.97 -1,190.98 -325.91 
Joint sign. inst. dum. χ2 (2) 1.27 3.05 4.17 0.78 1.07 2.05 
Joint sign. field dum. χ2 (6) 19.48*** 24.68*** 20.01*** 11.42* 14.00** 11.64* 
McFadden's R2 0.250 0.235 0.183 0.345 0.309 0.236 
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7 Appendix 
 
Table A.1: Scientific Productivity by Research Field (professors’ academic life time, e.g. all publications and patents until 2007) 
 Publications Patents
Field 
Publicati
ons 
-2007 
Citation Count 
of Publications 
-2007 
Citations  
per 
Publication 
Patents 
-2007 
Citation Count 
of Patents in 
-2007 
Citations 
per patent 
Physics 87.64 1,895.817 33.57 3.15 56.11 6.83
Mathematics and      
     Computer Science 19.86 186.75 11.48 0.79 14.28 7.65 
Chemistry 112.85 1,865.13 26.06 5.59 85.99 14.345 
Biology / Life 54.17 1,109.57 32.13 3.10 79.40 25.38 
Electrical 23.91 239.82 9.92 6.70 263.38 37.12 
Mechanical 16.36 86.79 7.36 6.14 150.53 11.06 
Other Engineering 36.93 401.79 12.72 5.85 107.54 10.16 
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Table A.2: Industry Funding of Higher Education Institutions in the Sample 
Institution Type State 
Professors 
in sample
Professors
surveyed
in state
average 
funding from 
industry in % 
of total budget
average funding from 
industry in % of total 
"third party funding"
average funding from 
industry in % of total 
"third party funding" 
in state from survey
# Students in 
State
          1999 1999 1999  2006
Albert-Ludwigs-University Freiburg Uni Baden-Wurttemberg  13 2.71 11.23 
FH Mannheim Poly Baden-Wurttemberg  4 0.68 50.00 
FHT Esslingen Poly Baden-Wurttemberg  12 2.19 25.42 
University of Stuttgart Uni Baden-Wurttemberg  37
66
10.29 23.57 
27.56 237 611 
FH Augsburg Poly Bavaria 2 3.33 50.00 
Ludwig Maximilian University of 
Munich Uni Bavaria 23 3.61 13.13 
TU München TU Bavaria 26 11.70 31.96 
University of Würzburg Uni Bavaria 17
68
4.70 10.65 
26.43 251 163 
Humboldt-University of Berlin Uni Berlin 12 1.53 3.42 
TFH Berlin Poly Berlin 12
12
13.75 35.00 
19.21 132120 
FH Brandenburg Poly Brandenburg 7 7 11.35 40.00 40.00 40 786 
Hochschule Bremen Poly Bremen 7 3.49 30.29 
University of Bremen Uni Bremen 19
26
4.94 15.05 
22.67 33 356 
Fachhochschule Hamburg Poly Hamburg 7 17.94 25.71 
TU Hamburg-Harburg TU Hamburg 24 11.70 38.13 
University of Hamburg Uni Hamburg 20
51
6.68 14.53 
26.12 65 908 
Fachhochschule Darmstadt Poly Hesse 13 1.20 26.15 
Johann Wolfgang Goethe University 
of Frankfurt Uni Hesse 13 5.31 10.94 
TU Berlin TU Hesse 39 9.30 31.49 
University of Kassel Uni Hesse 12
77
23.54 48.25 
29.21 157 452 
Ernst-Moritz-Arndt-University 
Greifswald Uni Mecklenburg-West Pom. 5 3.70 9.30 
Fachhochschule Neubrandenburg Poly Mecklenburg-West Pom. 1 0.00 0.00 
Otto-von-Guericke-University of 
Magdeburg Uni Mecklenburg-West Pom. 18 7.52 24.67 
University of Rostock Uni Mecklenburg-West Pom. 2
26
1.20 8.00 
10.49 34 221 
Fachhochschule 
Braunschweig/Wolfenbuttel Poly Lower Saxony  9 45 11.36 54.78 30.58 146 992 
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University of Goettingen Uni Lower Saxony  6 2.70 6.67 
University of Hannover Uni Lower Saxony  30 11.63 30.30 
FH Aachen Poly North Rhine-Westphalia  23 17.45 41.35 
Aachen University of Technology TU North Rhine-Westphalia  25 14.32 29.44 
University of Dortmund Uni North Rhine-Westphalia  18 8.96 23.11 
University of Cologne Uni North Rhine-Westphalia  9
75
5.11 13.33 
26.81 449 963 
Fachhochschule Kaiserslautern Poly Rhineland-Palatinate  3 0.00 0.00 
Fachhochschule Kaiserslautern, 
Zweibrücken Poly Rhineland-Palatinate  7 7.11 48.57 
University of Kaiserslautern Uni Rhineland-Palatinate  27
37
9.79 27.01 
25.19 97 514 
University of Saarlandes Uni Saarland 18 13.44 29.72 
HTW Saarland Poly Saarland 6
24
12.67 32.50 
31.11 19 334 
HTW Dresden Poly Saxony 9 12.02 35.00 
Dresden Technical University TU Saxony 25 9.41 26.53 
University of Leipzig Uni Saxony 16
50
2.45 7.04 
22.86 103 583 
Fachhochschule Magdeburg Poly Saxony-Anhalt 8 1.50 20.00 
Martin-Luther-University of Halle-
Wittenberg Uni Saxony-Anhalt 23
31
4.45 17.61 
18.80 50 097 
Christian-Albrechts-University of 
Kiel Uni Schleswig-Holstein 22 7.11 26.53 
Fachhochschule Flensburg Poly Schleswig-Holstein 11
33
11.22 50.56 
38.55 44 893 
Fachhochschule Erfurt Poly Thuringia 1 0.00 0.00 
Friedrich-Schiller-University of Jena Uni Thuringia 21 7.61 30.48 
TU Ilmenau TU Thuringia 16
38
7.19 18.48 
16.32 48 201 
Total / Average      678 678 7.39 24.91 25.09  
 
